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The Determinants of Firm Performance: Unions, Works Councils, and 
Employee Involvement/High Performance Work Practices 
 
Drawing on international evidence, this paper offers a survey of the effects of worker 
representation (in unions and works councils) and innovative work practices on firm 
performance. The focus is on the growing links between these two historically separate 
literatures. The interaction between worker representation and high performance work 
practices provides a practical means of peering inside the black box of collective voice, 
even if there is as yet no well-determined hierarchy for productivity performance and 
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“Their work [Freeman and Lazear, 1995] provides a theoretical basis for the presence 
and role of works councils but it could easily be applied to high performance workplace 
practices.” (Black and Lynch, 2000, p. 8) 
 
“German business would have had to invent codetermination if it had not been 
legislated.” (Attributed to Berthold Beitz, Managing Director, Fried. Krupp) 
 
I. Introduction 
In this paper we examine the associations between worker representation (i.e. in unions 
and works councils), employee involvement/innovative work practices, and various 
indicators of firm performance.
1 The two themes of workplace representation and 
innovative workplace practices have historically been analyzed separately, although in 
recent years they have shown more overlap. There are a number of reasons for this 
historical apartheid. First, the (linking) theme of collective voice was first applied to 
unions, where it shared equal billing with unionism’s monopoly face.
2 Second, employee 
involvement has tended to be seen as management-led and thus as a human resource 
management technique emphasizing high-commitment employment practices. (At the 
price of some imprecision, we will equate innovative work practices with high 
performance work practices and use both interchangeably with employee involvement.) 
Third, and coinciding with the decline in unionism and growth in human relations 
practices, there has been the suggestion that the unions and employee involvement are 
alternatives.
3  
On the other hand, several other forces have encouraged a more integrationist 
approach. First, developments in the collective voice model have emphasized cooperation 
and the possibility that institutional innovation might allow a decoupling of distribution 
from workplace issues. Second, the reduced bargaining power of unions might have 
produced the same result and elevated the pro-productive aspects of unionism subsumed 
under collective voice. The bottom line is that although most analyses of worker 
representation and employee involvement/high performance work practices have been 
conducted in isolation – while sometimes including the other as a control – research is 
beginning to consider their interaction.   3
In the present treatment, we will consider developments in the United States and 
Germany, only noting the British literature in qualification and en passant. The U.S. 
experience is of interest because it provides one of the least positive assessments of union 
impact while yet offering some early evidence of there being a mutually supportive 
relationship between union presence and employee involvement. The German experience 
is of interest because workplace representation occurs through the mechanism of the 
works council rather than the union. Historically, the works council has been viewed as 
the exemplar of collective voice because of its array of information, consultation, and 
participation/codetermination rights. Latterly, with the recognition of the bargaining 
problem, the German institution has become ever more closely identified with the 
expression of pro-productive voice by reason of its ‘peace obligation’ and the dual 
system of industrial relations within which it is embedded. That said, there has been 
comparatively little analysis of the interaction of workplace representation with more 
direct employee involvement mechanisms, although analysis of the training function 
might provide a promising bridge. 
The plan of the paper is as follows. To set the scene for our discussion of the 
empirical evidence, we first offer some theoretical conjectures on the efficiency 
properties of worker representation and employee involvement mechanisms. We next 
discuss for the United States the impact on firm performance of unions, employee 
involvement/high performance work practices, and their interaction. We follow this with 
a broadly parallel analysis for Germany, now with works councils substituting for the 
union institution. An interpretative section concludes. 
 
II. Theoretical Conjectures 
The arguments favoring unionism, works councils, and employee involvement/high 
performance work practices (EI/HPWP) are closely linked. Thus, the principal works 
council model is unambiguously an extension of the collective voice model, first 
advanced to make the case for unionism; the scope for EI/HPWP to improve performance 
rests on many of the same arguments used in the voice model; and the innovative work 
practices identified in the EI/HPWP literature may pierce the veil of the collective voice 
model which is opaque on mechanisms.   4
The collective voice model advanced by Freeman and Medoff (1984) is properly 
represented as a union voice-institutional response model. While arguing that voice is 
synonymous with (autonomous) unions, the authors are also concerned to make the point 
that voice cannot succeed without an appropriate response from management (and then 
from unions in response to any changes proposed by management). Freeman and Medoff 
(1984, p. 165) write: “Some managements will adjust to the union and turn unionism into 
a positive force at the workplace; others will not. Over the long run, those that respond 
positively will prosper while those that do not will suffer in the market place.”   
    The centerpiece of collective voice is the union role in providing information. 
The labor market context is important here: it is characterized by continuity rather than 
spot market contracting because of on-the-job skills specific to the firm and the costs 
attaching to worker mobility and labor turnover.
 Given the information problem in such 
complex and multidimensional continuity markets, there are two basic mechanisms to 
elicit information on worker preferences or discontent. Quit behavior can provide such 
information either inferentially or directly (via exit interviews). However, the collective 
voice model contends that such information is likely to suffer from selection biases, from 
problems of motivating the worker to disclose information when there is no benefit from 
doing so (and the certainty of some positive cost), and finally from the sheer cost of the 
process of trial and error in determining the efficacy of contract innovations.  
The other mechanism is voice. Collective voice through the agency of a union 
may outperform individual voice for several reasons. One reason is that nonrival 
consumption of shared working conditions (e.g., safety conditions, line speeds, and 
grievance procedures) and common workplace rules create a public goods problem of 
preference revelation. Without some collective form of organization, there will be too 
little incentive for the individual to reveal his or her preferences since the actions of 
others may produce the public good at no cost to that individual. Unions collect 
information about the preferences of all workers and ‘aggregate’ them to determine the 
social demand for such public goods. Substituting average preferences for marginal 
preferences and arbitraging of worker preferences may be efficient in such circumstances. 
Unions can determine the social demand for such goods, thereby enabling firms to choose 
a more efficient mix of personnel policies.   5
A second public goods dimension of the workplace stems from the nature of the 
input of effort. Without some form of collective organization, so this argument runs, the 
individual’s incentive to take into account the effects of his actions on others may be too 
small, just as with preference revelation. This problem will only arise where there are 
significant complementarities in worker effort inputs, so that output may depend on the 
lowest level of input by any one worker. In short, collective organization may potentially 
increase output through a joint determination of effort inputs and perhaps more so 
through increased cooperation between workers in continuity labor markets.
4  
  The expression of collective voice is expected to reduce exit behavior: quits, 
absenteeism, malingering, and even “quiet sabotage.” The reduction in quits in particular 
is expected to lower hiring and training costs and increase firm-specific investments in 
human capital. Apart from training effects, lower quits (inter al.) should also occasion 
less disruption in the functioning of work groups. Reduced exit behavior is the most 
tangible source of potential efficiency gain (to the parties) in the model.     
The other main aspect of collective voice is governance. In the context of the 
continuity relation, governance refers to the policing or monitoring of incomplete 
employment contracts. Governance will involve the use of grievance and arbitration 
procedures and other mechanisms to mitigate problems stemming from the authority 
relation. Such arrangements should help improve the flow of information between the 
two sides. The difficulty is that these specialized procedural arrangements are not unique 
to union settings, so that the argument presumably must be that unions make it easier (i.e. 
less costly) to negotiate and administer these arrangements. Unions may then facilitate 
long-term efficient contracting. A union specializing in information about the contract 
and in the representation of workers can prevent employers from engaging in 
opportunistic behavior. Workers may withhold effort and cooperation when the employer 
cannot credibly commit to take their interests into account. Fearing dismissal, workers 
may be unwilling to invest in firm-specific skills or disclose information facilitating pro-
productive innovations at the workplace.
5 The formation of a union and the introduction 
of a system of industrial jurisprudence is one way of protecting employees’ interests. In 
this way, unions may generate worker cooperation, including the introduction of   6
efficiency-enhancing work practices. In other words, if the reputation effects mechanism 
is weak, there is scope for unionism to be pro-productive.     
  If we assume that there is a commitment problem in regular markets, an 
interesting side issue is whether the divorce of ownership and control in the modern 
corporation could make self-enforcing contracts more feasible. More feasible in the sense 
that management might be less interested in reneging on an implicit contract in the 
interest of short-term profit maximization than the owner principal; and conversely where 
the interests of managers and shareholders are more closely aligned by, say, profit- 
sharing schemes for managers. In this case much might hinge on whether unions and self-
enforcing contracts are substitutes or complements in establishing workplace cooperation. 
If they are substitutes, any positive effect of unions on performance will be stronger in 
firms with less severe agency problems. If they are complements, unions will be more 
effective in firms where agency stimulates self-enforcing contracts. This argument is of 
course based on a very narrow view of the agency problem in corporations and must be 
widened to incorporate rent-seeking behavior by managers which may detract from 
trustful and cooperative industrial relations and may decrease the range of feasible self-
enforcing contracts. Jirjahn (2003) has recently examined the relationships between 
unions (actually works councils) and self-enforcing contracts and also those between 
agency and trustful, cooperative industrial relations using information on management 
profit-sharing schemes. We shall report some of his findings when looking at the German 
evidence   
  While governance receives emphasis, there is virtually no discussion of 
bargaining power in the original collective voice model. But in contract theory models in 
which the union can make credible the employer’s ex ante promises there must be some 
threat of credible punishment by the union (e.g. Malcomson, 1983). So it seems that the 
governance argument also depends on power: union monopoly power. Unfortunately, 
such power generally involves a holdup problem, with unions taxing the returns on 
tangible and intangible capital.  
The standard collective voice model treats the exertion of bargaining power and 
the expression of voice as distinct and offsetting facets of unionism (hence the reference 
to the “two faces” of unionism in Freeman and Medoff, 1984, p. 5). Recognition of   7
bargaining power is integral to the main theoretical justification for works councils in a 
model offered by one of the architects of collective voice. Thus, Freeman and Lazear 
(1995) argue that participation/codetermination will be underprovided by the market 
because institutions that give power to workers will affect the distribution as well as the 
size of the surplus. The ideas behind collective voice are fleshed out and set in a 
continuum bounded by information provision at one end and by participation or 
codetermination at the other. 
Freeman and Lazear argue that the joint surplus of the enterprise will increase as 
one moves cumulatively from information exchange through consultation to 
participation. Among other things, information rights can help verify management claims 
as to the state of nature, rendering them credible to the workforce and avoiding costly 
disputes – even precipitating the failure of the enterprise. Consultation for its part allows 
new solutions to production and other problems by reason of the non-overlapping 
information sets of the two sides and the creativity of discussion. Finally, participation or 
codetermination rights increase the joint surplus by providing workers with more job 
security and encouraging them to take a longer-run view of the firm and its prospects.  
However, Freeman and Lazear recognize that, unless constrained, these rights will 
give rise to a bargaining problem. Specifically, they argue that the workers’ share in the 
joint surplus grows with the surplus while that of capital declines both relatively and 
absolutely. The workers’ share rises because knowledge and involvement are power, so 
that the very factors that cause the surplus to rise also cause profitability to fall, with the 
result that workers will demand too much power/involvement because their share will 
continue to rise after the joint surplus has peaked. Symmetrically, employers will either 
oppose works councils or vest them with too little power because profits decline even as 
the surplus is increasing. 
Some means of third-party regulation limiting bargaining power has to be found if 
the societal benefits of worker voice are to be realized. Here, Freeman and Lazear see the 
German institution as attractive in two respects. First, the German works council cannot 
strike. Second, neither can it formally engage in bargaining over wages and other 
conditions of employment unless expressly authorized to do so under the relevant 
industry-level or regional collective bargaining agreement. In this respect, the authors   8
speak of a potential “decoupling” of the factors that determine the size of the surplus 
from those that determine its distribution. Left open is whether or not there is a sufficient 
decoupling in practice. Thus, even if the works council is an exemplary collective voice 
institution, theory does not provide an unambiguous answer as to its consequences for 
efficiency.  
Finally, the starting point of the EI/HPWP model is the notion that “workplace 
innovations change the production function in such a way as to increase the productivity 
of a firm’s inputs, in particular labor” (Cappelli and Neumark, 2001, p. 739). The basic 
premise is by now familiar: workers have important private information and valuable 
insights into how to improve their jobs. There is therefore scope for beneficial trades 
once workers are trained and presented with better opportunities to exercise their skills 
through job redesign, decreased supervision, and involvement in decision making, and 
motivated to contribute through productivity bonuses (Handel and Levine, 2004, p. 2). 
Recognition of these potentialities marks a shift in management philosophy from the 
status quo ante of traditional work systems and labor-management relations, even if there 
is considerable variation in how the new practices have been adopted in practice (for one 
taxonomy, see Godard, 2004). 
 EI/HPWPs ‘work’ by encouraging workers to work harder and smarter, and by 
inducing structural changes that improve performance. The idea that workers will work 
harder is based on their enjoying work more when the job is interesting and where it 
provides feedback and rewards (i.e. job enrichment). The second element more clearly 
reflects the distinct input of the worker in efficient job (re)design, not least when there are 
complementarities in production. As noted by Ichniowski, Kochan, Levine, Olsen, and 
Strauss (1996, pp. 301-302), the final element reflects such factors as cross training and 
flexible job assignment, which can reduce the cost of absenteeism; decentralized decision 
making to self-managed teams, permitting a reduction in line management while 
benefiting communication; and training in problem solving and computer skills, which 
can increase the benefits of new information technologies. In other words, innovative 
work practices beget other changes that improve productivity independent of their effects 
on motivation.   9
  The suggestion is that the various strands of employee involvement are 
interdependent and mutually reinforcing, Edgeworth complementarities. This is the 
notion of ‘bundling,’ namely, the idea that innovative high performance work practices 
are more effective when combined with supporting management practices (e.g. Milgrom 
and Roberts, 1995). As suggested earlier, compensation schemes such as profit sharing 
can incentivize employee involvement, and information disclosure and training can 
improve worker decisions at the same time as job security encourages them to take a 
long-run view of the firm and make suggestions. Another example is the potential 
synergies between job rotation, self managed teams, and pay-for-skill plans. However, 
this should not be taken to imply that the theory provides unambiguous guidance on 
either the identification or measurement of the bundles.  
One other point needs to be made. Although many of these arguments are 
consonant with the voice model, the conjunction of the growth in EI/HPWP and the 
decline in unionism at least raises the possibility that the two may be substitutes, either by 
design or by effect (i.e. by enhancing worker satisfaction they may reduce the demand for 
unionism). This is not without consequence for the empirical work reviewed below in 
which the maintained hypothesis is often that the two institutions are complementary. 
  In sum, there are theoretical grounds for supposing that both collective voice and 
EI/HPWP can improve the productivity of the workplace. Some observers profess to see 
little difference in the arguments for workplace representation and EI/HPWP when the 
industrial relations system offers some means of some means of decoupling production 
from distribution issues. Others might still argue that traditional workplace representation 
through unions is important to the success of innovative work practices – by, say, 
providing greater assurance that a serious hearing will be given to employees’ 
suggestions, or by virtue of union access to higher levels of management – or, 
backhandedly, that such practices offer a bigger payoff in union regimes with the 
elimination of restrictive practices, reminding us that in all such cases the monopoly face 
of unions has to be taken into account. Study of the effect of workplace representation on 
firm performance would seem to be quite closely bound up with the EI/HRWP issue. 
Moreover, comparisons between the United States and Germany might prove especially 




III. U.S. Evidence  
We next review U.S. findings on the determinants of firm performance, first 
distinguishing between union and employee involvement effects and then addressing the 
comparatively few treatments that have attempted to integrate the two mechanisms. 
 
Union Effects on Firm Performance 
The starting point for all analyses of union effects on firm performance must be Brown 
and Medoff’s (1978) pioneering production function study of U.S. manufacturing, using  
aggregate two-digit industry data cross classified by state groups for 1972. Using an 
augmented Cobb-Douglas production function, Brown and Medoff estimate 
                   ln(Y/L) ≈ lnA + αln(K/L) + (1-α)(c-1)P, 
where Y is a value-added measure of output, L is total labor (comprising union labor Lu 
and nonunion labor Ln), A is a constant of proportionality, K is capital, α and (1-α) are the 
output elasticities of K and L,  c indexes productivity differences between union and 
nonunion labor (c>1 indicating union labor is the more productive, and conversely for 
c<1), and P is union density, Lu/L.
6  
In this framework, the coefficient estimate for P  yields the logarithmic 
productivity differential of unionized establishments. Assuming this derives solely from 
labor inputs, dividing this coefficient by (1-α) gives the union labor productivity effect. 
Brown and Medoff estimate that the productivity of unionized establishments is between 
25 and 27 percent higher than that of comparable nonunion plants, implying a union 
productivity effect of 35 to 36 percent. Interesting, as we shall see, some of the first 
production function studies for German works councils obtained similarly high estimates. 
  In the years since Brown and Medoff’s study, evidence has steadily accumulated 
to the effect that average union effects in the United States are nowhere near as large as 
this. To start with, and abstracting from issues of restrictive functional form and 
limitations of value added as a measure of output, other similarly broadly-based studies 
have failed to confirm large effects. Perhaps the ‘closest’ study is by Hirsch (1991) who   11
estimates a variant of the Brown-Medoff model using data for a sample of around 570 
publicly quoted companies over the sample period 1968-80, matched to union data for 
1977. Hirsch’s OLS value-added production function includes in addition to capital, 
labor, the stock of R&D per employee, union density, variables measuring firm and 
industry growth, industry concentration, and import competition. He reports negative and 
statistically significant coefficients for union density (of around -17 percent). These 
estimates fall in absolute magnitude, the more detailed the industry dummies included: 
from -12.3 percent (2-digit level) through -8 percent (3-digit) to 3 percent (4-digit). Re-
estimating the production function for each of 19 industries yields some positive 
coefficient estimates for union density – examples include textiles and apparel, and 
fabricated metal products – but the majority of union effects remain negative. While 
conceding that union effects will likely vary considerably by industry and cannot be 
estimated precisely with existing techniques and data bases, Hirsch (1991, pp. 104-105) 
nevertheless concludes that there is nothing to support the contention of large and 
statistically significant positive union productivity effects. Rather, union productivity 
effects are small on average and insufficient to offset the union wage differential. 
We will return to the question of estimation technique (and the issues of omitted 
variables and union endogeneity) later in this discussion, but for completeness we should 
also note some findings from an earlier manufacturing industry study that are quite 
consistent with those of Hirsch. Using data from the Profit Impact of Market Strategy 
(PIMS) on 902 manufacturing businesses for 1970-80, Clark (1984) estimates similar 
value-added equations and finds small but well determined coefficient estimates for the 
union variable in the range -2 to -3 percent. On this occasion, however, the point 
estimates are not sensitive to inclusion of detailed controls. The bottom line is that, 
contrary to Brown and Medoff, average union productivity effects are small and as likely 
to be negative as positive. This interpretation is consistent with other pieces of 
information having to do with union effects on profitability (and employment). 
Before turning to these other performance outcomes, it is important to emphasize 
again that we are speaking of average union effects and not results from individual 
industry and firm-specific studies that in principle can avoid many of the econometric 
and data problems inherent in more aggregative studies (e.g. in the measurement of   12
output and in tackling input endogeneity problems).
7 Such advantages are achieved at the 
price of a loss in generality, however, and so the goal must be to use the unique 
perspective of such studies to help inform more aggregative exercises.     
Perhaps the most important indirect piece of evidence against large pro-
productive union effects of the magnitude suggested by Brown and Medoff’s (1978) 
study is the U.S. evidence on profitability. Unlike the recent British evidence, every U.S. 
study points to reduced profitability in union settings. This result holds irrespective of the 
financial indicator used (price-cost margin, rate of return on sales or capital, or market 
valuation of the firm’s assets/Tobin’s q), unit of observation (aggregate industry, firm, or 
line of business), or methodology. On the basis of the 16 studies reviewed in Addison and 
Hirsch (1989), unions are associated with 10 to 15 percent lower profitability. More 
recent studies provide confirmation of this central tendency and, again inconsistent with 
British results, contain little indication of any material change in the magnitude of the 
union effect over time (Hirsch, 1991; Hirsch and Morgan, 1994).  
However, and again abstracting from issues of statistical inference, the 
profitability evidence is not without controversy because the union effect might just be a 
transfer and thus neutral from an efficiency perspective (assuming perfect capital 
markets). Indeed, this is the take of Freeman and Medoff (1984, p. 186). Whatever the 
indications to the contrary in the earliest U.S. literature, however, subsequent research 
has indicated that unions do not capture a significant share of potential monopoly profits. 
For example, in his evaluation of profitability (two measures: Tobin’s q and the rate of 
return on capital) in 513 firms, 1968-80, Hirsch (1991) reports that although the four-firm 
industry concentration ratio is positively associated with profitability, the interaction 
between union density and concentration is both positive and statistically significant. In 
other words, the suggestion instead appears to be that union-nonunion differences in 
profitability are most substantial in highly competitive industries.   
There are clearly other sources of union rents such as sales growth and protected 
markets. However, the source that has most exercised U.S. researchers is distinctly 
competitive: the current and future quasi rents – or normal returns – on firm investments. 
U.S. research consistently points to a strong negative association between unionism and 
investment in physical and innovation capital (Hirsch, 1991; Bronars and Deere, 1993;   13
Bronars, Deere, and Tracy, 1994; Cavanaugh, 1998; Fallick and Hassett, 1999). The 
fullest analysis is by Hirsch (1991), who again presents pooled cross-section/time-series 
results for both types of investment in his sample of more than 500 firms. For capital 
investment he reports that the union firm with average coverage has annual capital 
investment that is 13 percent lower than its nonunion counterpart. The direct effect of 
unionism or the union tax on the returns to long-lived capital contributes a little under 
one-half of this effect. The other 7 percent is an indirect effect operating via the union 
impact on profitability, profits being an important determinant of capital investment. For 
R&D expenditures, unionized companies invest some 15 percent less than do comparable 
nonunion firms. Well over three-quarters of this effect is now direct, resulting from the 
union tax.
8 We should also note that Hirsch reports that union coverage is negatively 
associated with the ratio of advertising expenditures to sales. Furthermore, union 
coverage is also positively related to the propensity to patent, which should reduce the 
liability of the firm to hold up, ceteris paribus. That said, union coverage is unrelated to 
the ratio of debt to equity, higher values of which might be expected to lessen exposure to 
hold up (see, inter al., Baldwin, 1983). 
The U.S. evidence on investments in tangible and intangible capital does not 
augur well for long-run productivity growth in unionized companies. However, this 
implication is not corroborated in the productivity growth literature, where the slower 
growth on unionized firms is due to a disproportionate presence of unionization in 
industries with slower growth.
9 Hirsch (2004) contends that the implication of slowed 
growth in union companies is not inconsistent with this result because productivity 
growth equations typically control for both tangible and intangible capital. Vulgo: they 
address only the direct effects of unions, neglecting the important indirect effect 
operating through reduced investment. Accordingly, Hirsch directs our attention to the 
emerging employment growth literature (e.g. LaLonde, Marschke, and Troske, 1996; 
Dinardo and Lee, 2002). He interprets the evidence on slowed employment growth in 
unionized firms as the teleological outcome of their reduced investments in physical and 
intangible capital. That said, there is some lingering ambiguity in the notion of an 
employment maximand, as well as the potentially awkward result that unionized firms in 
the United States are apparently no more likely to fail than their nonunion counterparts.
10    14
  Summarizing, we see that on average union effects on productivity are small, that 
profitability is significantly reduced in union settings, and that investments in physical 
and intangible capital are also materially lower. The studies on which these findings are 
based attempt to deal with potential biases stemming from omitted variables and union 
endogeneity, but they not address mechanisms that might allow unionized establishments 
to do better than this, even outperform (some) nonunion plants.   
 
The Employee Involvement/High Performance Work Practice Literature 
As Cappelli and Neumark (2001, p. 738) note, the literature on work organization and 
attempts to reform it is vast. Here we offer an eclectic review of the impact of innovative 
work practices on several measures of firm performance that always has an eye to unions, 
reflecting the conjecture that participatory systems might work better in union regimes 
(Levine and Tyson, 1990). We preface our summary of the empirical evidence with some 
cautionary remarks on methodology that arise in this literature and are additional to the 
classic problem of omitted variable bias encountered in the union literature.  
  One important preliminary issue is what constitutes high performance work 
practices. Although different researchers have used different measures (and terminology), 
there but is some broad agreement that employee involvement is central to the definition 
(e.g. Applebaum and Batt, 1994). More concretely, TQM programs, quality circles, 
functional flexibility, and teamwork are core elements of HPWP. Aiding such practices 
are individual and organizational supports (the terminology is that of Forth and Millward, 
2004, p. 100). Examples of the former are information disclosure, job rotation, and 
training, while the latter include job security guarantees, internal labor market structuring, 
and financial participation. Management practices that are difficult to fit into this mold, 
but are no less central, include benchmarking and computer usage. Despite this 
agreement, as Handel and Levine (2004, pp. 14-15) note, measurement problems arise 
because there is no theoretical guidance on which combination of practices might be 
more effective and no unambiguous way of measuring the bundles. As we shall see, 
researchers have used interaction effects, additive indices, factor analysis, and 
combinations supported by a priori reasoning. A potentially major complicating factor is   15
that survey data may not go beyond identifying the presence of a practice, neglecting its 
reach, coverage and intensity.  
  Another important issue that needs to be raised at the outset is the diffusion of 
high performance work practices. Researchers typically do not have information on when 
a particular practice was initially introduced and typically do not have information on 
when it was discontinued. If researchers are observing a situation in cross section that is 
late in the diffusion of the practice in question, then any pro-productive effect will likely 
be biased downward. Also, there is a potentially serious loss of information arising from 
the failure to observe situations in which practices were discontinued. Even if the 
researcher has information on changes in practice (in either direction), and abstracting 
from measurement error, the panels are typically too short to accommodate learning 
effects. The bigger problem is of course that the number of changes in innovative 
practices in the typical panel is simply too small to take advantage of panel estimation 
techniques.   
The studies we next examine in detail are among the most recent U.S. empirical 
inquiries of workplace innovations. Since we focus on direct performance measures they 
do not include work on the relationship between EI/HPWP and earnings (for a review of 
which see Handel and Levine, 2004, Table 2). They constitute part of what Cappelli and 
Neumark (2001, p. 739) call the ‘second wave’ of research on organizational 
performance are very much in the spirit of the wider employee involvement/high 
performance work practice literature.  Table 1 provides the bare bones.  
(Table 1 near here) 
  Unionism is almost incidental in the first three studies in the table, and even when 
a union measure is included in the array of control variables its influence on the outcome 
indicator is scarcely documented. The leitmotiv of these studies is the attempt to make the 
best use of longitudinal and cross section data. In the case of the first row entry of Table 
1, the goal is indeed methodological: Huselid and Becker (1997) provide a follow-up 
study of an earlier cross-section analysis by one of the authors (Huselid, 1995), now 
using panel data for 1993-96 to control for firm fixed effects while examining the 
sensitivity of the latter to measurement error.
11   16
  Huselid and Becker identify no less than 13 ‘human resource management 
practices’ and consider their impact on two measures of financial performance. Factor 
analysis is used to construct two factors measuring the extent of use each of the practices. 
The two factors are termed ‘employee skills and organizational structures’ and ‘employee 
motivation,’ suggesting that they may include constituent elements that others might not 
consider to be high performance practices (Godard, 2004, p. 354). The control variables 
comprise capital intensity, employment, union coverage, the R&D sales ratio, and sales 
growth. The upshot of the authors’ analysis is that factors having a statistically significant 
effect on financial performance in (three out of four) cross section(s) were no longer 
significant using a fixed effects specification. The story does not end here as Huselid and 
Becker report sizeable measurement error in the workplace practices. Based on 
independent estimates of the measurement error (Cronbach’s alpha), they argue that the 
fixed effects estimates become closer to the cross section estimates and in particular that 
a one standard deviation increase in a unidimensional measure (being the sum of the two 
dimensions noted above) of high performance work systems increases the market 
valuation of the corporation by $15,000 per worker. However, as noted by Cappelli and 
Neumark (2001, p. 741), the problem of measurement error is exacerbated in a short 
panel of this nature because most firms would have had the work practices in question so 
that we would expect there to be little difference in their use over the two-year interval in 
question (the practices were observed in 1991 and again in 1993). 
  The advantage of the study in row 2 of the table is that in examining a single 
process – steel finishing – within an industry, the problem of output heterogeneity is 
presumably minimized. And in constructing a long time series, the beginning of which is 
likely marked by an absence of high performance work practices, the impact of those 
practices might be better discerned – subject to various caveats on the diffusion of the 
practices in question. In this study, Ichniowski, Shaw, and Prennushi (1997) identify 15 
human resource management practices that cover incentive pay, recruitment and 
selection, teamwork, flexible job assignment, employment security, skills training, 
communication, and labor relations. As noted in the table, these are subsequently grouped 
into a hierarchy of four distinct human resource management systems. The delineation is 
on the basis of a priori reasoning, supported by several statistical procedures. The   17
hallmark of this study is, then, a hypothesized complementarity of workplace practices. 
The workplace practices are accompanied by detailed controls (among the time-varying 
regressors included in the fixed effects specifications are age of line, start-up periods, the 
quality of steel input, and the introduction of new equipment). The dependent variable is 
product uptime.  
  It is reported that the more innovative human resource systems that significantly 
increase line uptime in cross section have similar effects when controlling for permanent 
unobserved line heterogeneity, unlike the study by Huselid and Becker in row 1 of the 
table. Consistent with that study, however, is the finding of complementarity in 
employment practices. Individual practices have little or no incremental effect on 
productivity. That is to say, when individual practices are added to regressions containing 
the HRM systems of practices, they have little additional effect on productivity; and in 
comparing these (OLS and fixed effects) regressions with ones containing only the 
individual practices, the typically well determined estimates for the latter (including in 
one specification a negative effect of unionism) effectively vanish with the addition of 
the system effects. Ichniowski, Shaw, and Prennushi’s (1997, p. 311) conclude that 
“systems of HRM practices determine productivity … while marginal changes in 
individual practices have little effect.” That said, there are some lingering ambiguities in 
the study stemming from the collinearity among practices, and no discussion of whether 
all practices in the round contributed independently of the other bundles (Godard, 2004, 
p. 355). 
  The study by Cappelli and Neumark (2001) in row 3 of the table uses information 
on working practices from a nationally representative sample of establishments based on 
two surveys (the National Employers Surveys for 1994 and 1997) with a high response 
rate. These establishments are matched to LRD data to obtain information on their 
performance, productive inputs, and other characteristics. Another distinguishing 
characteristic of the study is its use of multiple outcome indicators, the goal being to 
determine whether increases in productivity translate into improved performance by 
lowering unit costs.  
  To all intents and purposes, the high performance work practices are only 
observed at one point in time – strictly speaking the practices are observed in two years   18
but five such practices are unique to the 1994 survey while six are asked of both surveys 
– but a long panel(s) is constructed by matching establishments in the cross section data 
to the 1977 LRD. Here the assumption is that the innovative work practices did not exist 
in 1997, so that the innovative practices in levels can be used in fixed effect 
specifications as all observations necessarily pertain to changes. The authors present 
results for two panels, 1977-93 and 1977-96, as well as for two cross sections, 1993 and 
1996.  
  As in the row 1 and 2 studies, Cappelli and Neumark also look for synergies in 
innovative work practices. They first enter the practices individually and then in 
groupings suggested by design (e.g. teamwork training is designed to improve 
performance in teams and should be more productive with employee meetings and self-
managed teams) or prior research. As shown in the table, the results are mixed, pointing 
to few synergies and much evidence of heterogeneity bias in cross section. In terms of the 
three outcome indicators, the main results are that high performance work practices raise 
labor costs per worker, that they may raise productivity (sales per employee), and that 
they have no effects on unit labor costs. The last result may mean that, at a pinch, 
productivity and labor costs may be offsetting.  
  The study in row 4 of the table is notable for being the first to do more than 
simply include a union variable in the control set. Cooke (1994) examines whether 
unionism positively or negatively influences the effectiveness of employee-participation 
programs and group-based incentives in his sample of Michigan manufacturing firms.
 
Cooke’s measure of performance is value added net of labor cost per employee. To 
calculate this magnitude he estimates three equations: value added per employee, wage 
rates, and labor cost/total cost. That is to say, he subtracts the estimated wage differential, 
adjusted by the labor cost share differential, from the estimated value added per employee 
differential to derive the performance measure.  
  His measure of employee involvement is a dummy variable indicating the 
presence or otherwise of team working, and his group incentives variable is another 
dichotomous variable capturing the presence or otherwise of either profit-sharing or 
gainsharing plans. These dichotomous variables are separately and jointly interacted with 
the union status of the firm; the omitted category being the compound ‘nonunion/no   19
gainsharing/no group incentive pay.’ The other regressors include firm size, depreciable 
assets per employee (albeit only at the firm’s 2-digit primary industry, so that the same 
capital intensity is assigned to union and nonunion workplaces alike), and proxies for the 
skill composition of the workforce, technology, and market power.  
  Using the estimated differentials associated with each combination of employee 
involvement, group incentive pay, and union status, Cooke estimates their performance 
effects. The basic result is that unions elevate pay less than they increase productivity.  
Alone among the studies, Cooke reports that firm performance is 13 percent higher in 
unionized plants without either employee involvement or incentive pay than in 
comparable nonunion firms. The introduction of team working raises this differential to 
around 35 percent. By contrast, its introduction in the nonunion sector does not improve 
the innovating (nonunion) firm’s net performance. In the absence of teamwork, group 
incentive pay has a much larger effect on efficiency in nonunion firms (+18.5 percent) 
than in union firms (+6.5 percent). In combination, the two measures also have a much 
bigger performance payoff in nonunion (+21 percent) than union (-0.7 percent) firms. 
While suggesting that the payoff to employee involvement and incentive pay may sharply 
differ in union and nonunion regimes, this study clearly paints a much rosier picture of 
union impact than the material reviewed earlier. Unfortunately, we are not told the 
statistical significance of the effects on performance. The cross section nature of the 
study, the deficiencies of the capital measure, and issues of representativeness are 
additional sources of concern. 
  The study in row 5 of the table attempts to deal with each concern. Black and 
Lynch (2001) estimate production functions for a large, nationally representative sample 
of manufacturing establishments. The authors fit augmented Cobb-Douglas production 
functions to both cross section and panel data for 1987-93, having much richer data than  
Cooke.
12 The authors identify six high performance work systems (TQM, benchmarking, 
number of managerial levels, number of employees per supervisor, the proportion of 
workers in self-managed teams, and the {log} number of employees in training), two 
employee voice measures (unionization and the proportion of employees meeting 
regularly in groups), and two types of profit sharing (for management/ supervisors and 
production/clerical/technical). Panel techniques are used in an attempt to tackle a   20
potential omitted variables problem due to unobserved establishment characteristics (but 
see below). Specifically, Black and Lynch use a two stage procedure that involves first 
estimating a fixed, time-invariant firm effect for each establishment using data for the 
time-varying factors – namely, capital, labor, and raw materials – and then regressing 
these fixed effects (or firm-level efficiency parameters) on all the time-invariant factors.
13 
  The cross-sectional estimates indicate that, although most of the high performance 
work practices are positively associated with labor productivity, only benchmarking is 
statistically significant at conventional levels. Of the separate voice and profit sharing 
arguments the proportion of workers meeting regularly in groups – although not 
unionization – and nonmanagerial profit sharing are positively and significantly 
associated with productivity in most specifications. Contrary to the studies in the first two 
rows of Table 1, Black and Lynch report that there is no evidence of a synergistic 
bundling of the high performance work systems, although there is a positive and 
statistically significant association between unionization and nonmanagerial profit 
sharing.
14 Finally, the results for the panel data second-step estimation are much the same 
as the cross-sectional results, although in the specification containing interaction terms 
the own effect of unionism becomes negative, much larger in absolute magnitude, and 
marginally statistically significant (even if this effect is more than counteracted by the  
positive interaction between unionism and nonmanagerial profit sharing).  
   Black and Lynch use their estimates to show how unionized establishments that 
embrace what are termed “transformed” industrial relations practices can have higher 
productivity than nonunion plants. Specifically, a hypothetical union plant practicing 
benchmarking and total quality management, with 50 percent of its workers meeting on a 
regular basis, and operating profit sharing for its nonmanagerial employees is reported to 
have 13.5 percent higher labor productivity than a nonunion plant with none of these 
practices. By contrast, the corresponding differential for a high performance nonunion 
establishment is just 4.5 percent. In contrast to the row 4 study, however, if union and 
nonunion plants possess none of these workplace practices, the nonunion establishments 
have 10 percent higher labor productivity than their union counterparts. Note there is no 
attempt in this study to discover whether the workplace practices in question are   21
positively related to average costs per worker (for evidence of which, see Cappelli and 
Neumark, 2001, in row 3).  
  Black and Lynch (2001, p. 443) themselves note that, despite the use of panel 
methods, the regressors used in the second stage procedure refereed to earlier may still be 
correlated with unobserved time invariant plant level characteristics, thereby biasing the 
coefficient estimates on high performance workplace practices. One such variable is of 
course managerial quality. If more able managers are found in establishments that have 
greater recourse to such practices then the effects attributed to them may simply reflect 
good management. In the last row entry of Table 1, in their new study Black and Lynch 
(2000) present results from using a second wave of the dataset containing information on 
work practices and estimate a model in first differences, 1993-96 (as well in cross section 
for 1996). As can be seen from the table, compared with the row 5 study there is some 
redefinition of high performance work systems, including the use of a new variable 
‘reengineering.’  Another change is that unionization is now interacted with four of the 
work practices, including the proportion of workers meeting regularly in groups. 
  The results differ somewhat from Black and Lynch (2001).  Commenting here on 
just the fixed effects findings, we see that reengineering is the only work practice with a 
statistically significant pro-productive own effect. For its part, the own effect of 
unionization is poorly determined throughout, although when interacted with the worker 
meeting variable the effect is positive and statistically significant. The own effect of 
worker meetings is strongly negative.
15   
  A final study not included in Table 1 nevertheless merits attention because it 
addresses the vexed issue of contingency in a union and high performance work practice 
context. The setting is the course of productivity at a single commercial aircraft 
manufacturer, 1974-91. During the sample period there were three strikes and one work 
to rule, one major production change, three (five) changes in top management (union 
presidents), and the introduction of a TQM program towards the end of the sample period 
that included high levels of employee involvement and formal assurances of job 
security.
16 Kleiner, Leonard, and Pilarski (2002) provide a detailed history of these 
industrial relations developments based on interviews with production managers and 
union leaders, and estimate an engineering production function to investigate the effect of   22
these changes. As expected, withdrawals of labor are associated with reduced 
productivity; also as expected, it only takes between one to four months to return to pre-
strike productivity. Union leadership also seems important, while productivity appears 
highest when hawks on both sides negotiate. The effects of TQM are if anything 
perverse, which result is held to reflect the manner of its introduction (“a top-down 
process that never fully won the embrace of the line workers or their front-line 
supervisors”) (Kleiner, Leonard, and Pilarski, 2002, p. 203). It is argued that TQM was 
bearing fruit at exactly the time management’s patience ran out (although the shift back 
to an authoritarian structure produced improved results in the short run). No less 
interesting, the authors observe that the effects of TQM may be upwardly biased because 
they fail to account for the impact of firms that are unsuccessful in implementing it – an 
inference that might be generalized to other practices pending improved datasets 
containing information on EI/HPWP dissolutions as well as adoptions.   
  The results of the more recent U.S. literature on innovative work practices are, 
then, decidedly mixed both as regards the impact of particular practices and synergies 
between them. Abstracting from causation issues, positive effects on productivity where 
observed are only one-half the story, impact on the bottom line is the other. 
Contingencies may also cast a long shadow in reaching a judgment on the role of such 
practices. This setting is not altogether propitious for assessing the contribution of the 
union institution, and it is unsurprising that the mainstream EI/HPWP literature has 
practiced benign neglect here. Yet recent U.S. evidence does point to some positive 
interaction effects between individual work practices and unionism. Indeed, even though 
the nature of some of the associations is at times opaque, it has sometimes been claimed 
that there is a hierarchy for productivity performance with unionized plants having 
innovative practices at the top – above those of nonunionized plants with the same set of 
practices – and at the bottom in traditional workplaces. This conclusion and the use of 
synthetic workplaces to identify hierarchies is premature but the literature has 
demonstrated potential offsets to the union wage differential.  
 
IV. German Evidence   23
Reflecting the facts of workplace representation, most German studies have focused on 
the impact of works councils rather than unions, although interest in the union role – 
strictly, the collective agreement external to the establishment – has increased in the wake 
of Freeman and Lazear’s (1995) extension of the voice model.
17 Before we examine the 
evidence on the effect of works councils, EI/HPWP, and their interaction on firm 
performance, however, we sketch some salient characteristics of the German 
institution(s).  
 
A Primer on Works Councils 
Works councils are mandatory but not automatic – they must be voted in by employees – 
in German establishments with at least five employees. They are found in 16.3 percent of 
all establishments although they cover 53 percent of the workforce. The frequency of 
works councils is directly related size of establishment, increasing monotonically from 
just 9.1 percent in plants with 5-20 employees to 91.7 percent in plants with more than 
500 employees (see Addison, Bellmann, Schnabel, and Wagner, 2003).  
Works councils have formal information, consultation, and participation rights set 
down under law. Although the information and consultation rights are more extensive 
than in other systems, it is the codetermination rights that set the German entity apart. 
These codetermination (or participation) rights are far reaching and cover such matters as 
the regulation of working hours, the fixing of job and bonus rates and other forms of 
performance related pay, and the introduction technical devices to monitor employee 
effort. Recent changes in the law have extended codetermination rights to vocational 
training measures and the execution of team-working arrangements (see Addison, 
Bellmann, Schnabel, and Wagner, 2004, pp. 395-398).  
In each case, the rights of the works council are increasing in employment size. 
Increased information and consultation rights are first triggered at 21 employees. As 
examples, the employer has to provide the works council with detailed information on 
individual personnel movements – codetermination in individual staff movements also 
applies at this threshold – and, in the separate circumstance of proposed alterations that  
may entail substantial prejudice to the workforce as a whole (reductions in operations, 
transfer of departments, amalgamations of establishments, and introduction of new   24
working methods), the employer must first inform and then consult the works council on 
the proposed alterations. Additional information rights accrue with more than 100 
employees: a finance committee has to be set up, charged with the duty to provide the 
works council with very detailed financial information on the company including its 
economic and financial situation, production and investment programs, rationalization 
plans, and the introduction of new work methods. Again, once establishment employment 
reaches 200, the employer the must make provision for a full-time (i.e. paid) councilor, 
and as before the number of full-time (and indeed all) councilors is increasing in 
establishment size. Another size-related condition is the right of the works council in 
plants with more than 1,000 employees to request the drawing up of guidelines on the 
technical, personal and social criteria to apply in the engagement, grading, and transfer of 
workers. 
We mentioned earlier the duty of the employer to consult on alterations involving 
prejudice to the workforce. In such circumstances, the work council can subsequently 
negotiate a social plan, by way of compensation. Social plans are a special form of work 
agreement. These bilateral plant-level agreements between the employer and the works 
council are prescribed by law and cannot cover wages and other conditions of 
employment that are fixed or normally determined by collective agreement, unless 
authorized to do so by the relevant industry- or regional-level collective agreement. 
However, as Müller-Jentsch (1995, p. 60-61) reports, the contents of works agreements 
have in practice ranged much further well beyond the terms fixed by the law. 
Accordingly, although works councils cannot strike and are enjoined to work with the 
employer in spirit of collaboration – refraining from activities “that interfere with or 
imperil the peace in the establishment” – the inference would be that separation of 
distribution from production issues in the German dual system is partial.  
Finally, works councils are formally independent of unions, and they are elected 
by the entire workforce. That said, unions play an important role in the election of works 
councilors (putting up union lists of candidates in the nomination process), and most 
works councilors are union members. As a result, works councils have been referred to as 
“pillars” of union security. Be that as it may, data limitations have, with the exceptions 
noted below, largely precluded investigation of the union-works council nexus, and of   25
late the union interest has tended to be subsumed under a collective bargaining variable, 
namely, whether or not the establishment is covered by a collective bargaining 
agreement. Recalling the discussion of section II, following an external agreement is 
hypothesized to moderate rent seeking by the works council. 
 
Works Councils and Establishment Performance 
In a reversal of the pattern of the U.S. literature on worker representation, the early 
German literature pointed to mostly negative effects of works councils on firm 
performance. These studies cover a wide range of performance outcomes – total factor 
productivity, profits, product innovation and R&D, investment in physical capital and 
(excessive) quits – do not lack rigor,
18 and contain detailed information on establishment 
characteristics and sometimes union density (on the interaction of union density and 
works councils, see FitzRoy and Kraft, 1990; Schnabel and Wagner, 1994) have the 
disadvantage of small sample size – typically around 100 firms/plants – raising obvious 
issues of external validity. (For a review of this literature, see Addison, Schnabel, and 
Wagner, 2004.) 
More recently, analysts have been able to work with much larger data sets, 
namely, the Hannover Firm Panel, the NIFA-Panel, and the nationally representative  
Establishment Panel of the Institute for Labor Market Research, or IAB Establishment 
Panel. The Hannover Panel is a stratified random sample of all manufacturing plants with 
at least five employees in the German state of Lower Saxony, 1994-97. It comprises 
around 1,000 establishments in 1994, declining to a little over 700 establishments in 1997 
because of sample attrition. The NIFA-Panel is a survey of all establishments in the 
German machine-tool industry, 1991-98. The sample base is around 6,000 firms and the 
realized sample approximates 1,500 per wave. Finally, the IAB Establishment Panel has 
been conducted each year from 1993 (for eastern Germany from 1996 onward). It is 
based on a stratified random sample – strata for 16 industries and 10 size classes – from 
the population of all establishments with at least one employee covered by social 
insurance.  The panel is created to serve the needs of the Federal Labor Agency, and so 
its focus is on employment-related matters. The two other surveys contain somewhat 
richer establishment information, and, in the case of (one wave of) the NIFA-Panel,   26
subjective data on works council ‘type’ and ‘degree of works council involvement’ from 
a management perspective (see Dilger, 2002). That said, the IAB Establishment Panel 
contains the only nationally representative longitudinal sample of establishments and 
unlike the other two data sets it is possible to proxy the capital stock.
19 
  Table 2 reports results from a selection of studies using two of the new data sets. 
It is not meant to be fully inclusive of the literature for two reasons. First of all, it is 
deliberately ‘light’ on the more descriptive labor turnover literature, the thrust of which is 
nonetheless conveyed by the study summarized in row 1 and 2 of the table.
20 Second of 
all, it is only one-half the research that we consider: Table 4 reviews studies that also 
consider EI/HPWP (to include training).  
(Table 2 near here) 
The most notable feature of the studies using these large datasets is their more 
favorable evaluation of works council impact. For the two studies using the Hannover 
Firm Panel (rows 1 and 2 of the table), the pro-productive effect of the works council 
depends on establishment size and collective bargaining regime, respectively. Addison, 
Schabel, and Wagner (2001) report that works council presence is associated with higher 
value-added per employee only for the all-firm sample; for smaller establishments with 
between 21 and 100 employees the association is statistically insignificant. This result 
might reflect a theme of the earlier literature to the effect that for smaller firms the 
advantages of codetermination may be lower and the costs higher than for larger firms. 
But the authors’ own justification for focusing on this sub-sample is two-fold: first, 
lacking information on works council type, it makes sense to estimate the effect of the 
entity for a sample in which the rights/powers of the works council are a datum; second, 
only in this employment range are establishments with and without works councils 
present in reasonable numbers, as opposed to being dominant (see above). Apart from 
there being no evidence of higher productivity within this sample, Addison, Schnabel, 
and Wagner also report that works councils are not associated with reduced labor 
turnover in this sub-sample either, although they obtain the conventional effect for the 
all-establishment sample.  
For their part, Hübler and Jirjahn (row 2) emphasize not establishment size but 
instead whether or not the establishment is covered by a collective agreement. They seek   27
to test the argument of Freeman and Lazear (1995) that where a works council is 
embedded in a (external) collective bargaining arrangement, the control exerted by the 
union and the employers’ federation can serve to dissipate distributional squabbles at the 
workplace allowing the voice effects to realized. As can be seen, they report that pro-
productive works council effects are only found where the establishment follows a 
collective agreement.   
The Hannover Firm Panel does not contain information on the capital stock, 
raising the potential problem of omitted variables bias. However, the capital stock may be 
inferred from data on replacement investment in the IAB Establishment Panel. Using this 
information, the study by Frick (2003) in row 3 of the table provides one of the first 
estimates of a works-council-augmented production function for Germany (see also 
Addison, Kraft, and Wagner, 1993; FitzRoy and Kraft, 1987). The magnitude of the 
works council ‘effect’ is highly reminiscent of the union effects reported by Brown and 
Medoff (1978) some 25 years earlier for the United States. Plants with works councils 
have 25-30 percent higher productivity than their counterparts without works councils.  
Drawing on secondary evidence that wages are higher in works council plants, Frick 
(2003, p. 448) nevertheless cautions that these effects may not compensate firms for the 
additional costs.
21  
  The next two studies summarized in Table 2 that also use the IAB Establishment 
Panel question this large productivity effect of works councils (as indirectly does the final 
study in row 6). Substituting sales for value added on data grounds – for example, 
respondents often fail to answer the materials cost question in the panel survey
22 – and 
restricting the sample to plants with between 21 and 100 employees, Schank, Schnabel, 
and Wagner (2004) estimate frontier productions for separate samples of firms with and 
without works councils, 1993-2000. They report no statistically significant differences in 
the technical efficiencies of the median plant in the two samples. Using a very different 
approach, the study by Addison, Bellmann, Schnabel, and Wagner (2004) in row 5 of the 
table seeks to carefully match plants that witnessed the formation of works councils in 
1998 and those that remained free of works councils for the entire sample period (1996-
2000). For their four outcome indicators, including a proxy for productivity growth, they 
report no statistically significant differences in mean performance among the two types of   28
firms. This study represents one attempt to deal with selection problems that dog the 
other estimates in Table 2.  
The final study in row 6 of the table is relevant from the perspective of another 
type of potential bias attaching to both cross section and (balanced) panel estimates alike, 
namely, the problem that we are observing survivors. Underperforming works council 
plants may have been evoluted out of the system, leaving an unrepresentative sample of 
survivors. The study by Addison, Bellmann, and Kölling (2004) does find that other 
things being equal works council firms do fail at higher rates than their non-works 
council counterparts. Although this hints at survival bias, we would caution that this 
evidence is indirect (i.e. survivability should be modeled simultaneously with the 
performance equation), that the failure rates in question are low, and that the number of 
industry controls is for statistical reasons quite limited.  
(Table 3) 
By the same token, one should continue to be wary of the ambitious pro-
productive works council effects provided in row 3 of the table. In Table 3, we present 
summary results from fitting a translog production function to pooled data for 1997-2000 
from the IAB Establishment Panel. The dependent variable is sales (rather than value 
added) and the sample is restricted to firms with 21-100 employees, other than in the last 
row of the table where pooled estimates for the entire sample of establishments with five 
or more employees are given in bold for purposes of comparison. Although works 
council ‘effects’ are in our view still uncomfortably large,
23 note first the differences 
between the coefficient estimates in the pooled regressions for the sample comprising 
plants of all sizes and the sub-sample of establishments with 21-100 employees. Next 
observe the generally insignificant coefficients for the all-important German 
manufacturing sector in both pooled and cross-section data. Then observe the variation in 
the coefficient estimates in cross section. Finally consider that there are no a priori 
grounds for expecting major differences in works council effects as between 
manufacturing and services. Taken in conjunction with the evidence in Table 2, we 
would argue that although the early German literature most likely encouraged an overly 
negative view of works council operation some of the more recent estimates are likely to 
do exactly the opposite.    29
 
EI/HPWP, Works Councils and Firm Performance 
As with the U.S. evidence on unions, however, the issue of works council impact does 
not end here. Rather more than in the United States perhaps, discussion of the effects of 
worker representation in Germany has become linked with those of innovative work 
practices. Table 4 provides a summary of the diverse literature. The themes of this 
literature, mostly based on the three large-scale datasets introduced earlier, include works 
council type, incentivization issues, complementarities, and training. Together the studies 
point to circumstances in which works councils may be associated with favorable 
productivity outcomes.  
(Table 4 near here) 
  We begin with the study by Frick (2002) (row 1) which, although descriptive, is 
notable for its attempts to investigate directly the impact of works council type (see also 
Dilger, 2002). The only large-scale data set to contain such information is the (sixth wave 
of the) NIFA-Panel. As can be seen, Frick’s results using this information are mixed. 
Thus, HPWPs are not significantly more numerous in works council plants than others 
and while ‘more involved’ councils tend to have more HPWPs those works councils 
dubbed ‘antagonistic’ by management have the most. Similarly, while HPWPs are 
reported in the author’s multiple classification analysis to benefit firm performance, they 
are also said to be associated with reduced labor demand. 
  Unlike the other studies reviewed in Table 4, the analysis in row 2 is based on an 
early sample of just 65 metal working firms. This dataset was first used by FitzRoy and 
Kraft (1985, 1987, 1990) in a series of studies charting the impact of works councils on 
profitability, total factor productivity, and innovation. Adverse works council effects 
were reported for all outcome indicators in systems of equations that typically 
endogenized works council presence. But in this their most recent investigation, FitzRoy 
and Kraft (1995) report find that works council effects on labor productivity are actually 
positive and statistically significant in regimes practicing profit sharing, even if they are 
negative and well determined in other regimes. The authors attribute the positive works 
council effect to cooperative labor relations.    30
  FitzRoy and Kraft find that profit sharing is associated with sharply higher 
productivity – in both single and simultaneous equation treatments. This result is not 
generally found in the large-scale data sets; for example, neither Frick (2002) (row 3, 
Table 2), using the IAB Establishment Panel, nor Hübler and Jirjahn (2003) (see row 2, 
Table 2), using the Hannover Firm Panel, observe discern this outcome.
24 Abstracting 
from measurement issues (on which more below), an interesting extension of the 
incentives discussion is profit sharing for executives. The study by Jirjahn in row 3 of 
Table 4 finds that managerial profit sharing strongly improves productivity, suggesting 
that it attenuates agency problems. But this issue is only part of the story, the other is 
works council presence and its interaction with executive profit sharing. As can be seen 
from the table, the coefficient estimate for works council presence is positive and 
statistically significant while that for the interaction term is negative and again well 
determined. Focusing on the latter result, Jirjahn argues it is consistent with two 
hypotheses: either profit sharing reduces the commitment value of agency in 
circumstances where works councils cannot foster trust and loyalty absent the 
cooperation of management, or management rent seeking is curbed by profit sharing and 
the works council is not important for building cooperation in situations of reduced 
opportunism on the part of management. Although these empirical findings have yet to be 
replicated in other data sets, central to Jirjahn’s approach is the notion that the 
management environment of the firm matters in evaluating works council impact. His 
approach is also very much in the spirit of collective voice model, even if the contribution 
of the works council is not transparent. This latter remark in turn reflects some negative 
correlations noted in the literature such as that between team work and works councils, 
and most of all the simple fact that the magnitude of the negative interaction term 
between works councils and executive profit sharing exceeds that of the positive point 
estimate for works council presence. 
The remaining three studies in Table 4 follow a common methodology suggested 
in part by Black and Lynch (2001) (see row 5, Table 1) and use the IAB Establishment 
Panel. Especial emphasis is placed upon on selection issues and unobserved plant 
heterogeneity.  The study by Wolf and Zwick (2002) in row 4 of the table provides the 
template for the other two studies. Wolf and Zwick focus on the productivity of HPWPs.   31
They identify seven such practices, which are reduced to two independent factors – 
termed “organizational changes” (participatory practices such as team work) and 
‘incentives’ (e.g. profit sharing) – using principal components analysis. The authors fit an 
augmented Cobb-Douglas production function to cross-section data for 1999, including a 
selectivity-adjusted specification. They also fit a Cobb Douglas function to data for 1996-
99 using panel estimation methods, and derive a fixed time invariant establishment-
specific effect for each plant after Black and Lynch, which values are then regressed on 
the time invariant covariates – including organizational changes and incentives – again 
allowing for selection. Note that the dataset only enables the authors to identify whether 
or not the innovative practices were present at a point in time, not when they had been 
introduced.    
  As shown in Table 4, both selection and accounting for structural differences 
matter. The positive effect on productivity of incentive mechanisms, observed in both 
cross section and in the panel, seem to result from such schemes being introduced in 
times of plenty, when firms are doing well as. That is, after correction for the endogeneity 
of such measures, the variable is no longer statistically insignificant. For their part, the 
effect of organizational changes is statistically insignificant in cross section, with and 
without correction for selection. However, the coefficient estimate is both positive and 
well determined in the panel estimates, and after controlling for selection strengthens 
somewhat. The main message of this study, therefore, is that firms which introduce 
organizational changes seemingly have unobserved time invariant characteristics that 
decrease their productivity. Expressed differently, participatory work practices raise 
productivity.  
The results pertaining to incentive mechanisms clearly qualify the results of 
FitzRoy and Kraft (1995) (row 2 of Table 4) who control for the endogeneity of profit 
sharing but not unobserved firm heterogeneity. Wolf and Zwick nevertheless do argue 
that works councils work – the coefficient estimate for the variable is positive and 
statistically significant in the second step panel procedure – even they do not seem to 
influence organizational change. (Our wider concern with the lack of temporal variation 
in both the HPWP measures and works council presence is revisited below.) Finally, two 
other results from the cross section part of this study might be noted. Not only is there no   32
evidence of synergies between the two sets of innovative practices but also very few 
instances of complementarities between their components. 
The role of the work council is secondary in Wolf and Zwick. In the next study in 
the table, it shares equal billing with innovative work practices. Zwick (2003) (row 5) 
considers just those practices found to be statistically significant in Wolf and Zwick – 
namely, organizational changes, now termed ‘participation’ – and considers their impact 
on productivity over the same interval, albeit using a different panel estimator for the 
(first stage) production function and now controlling for the endogeneity of works 
council presence (as well as that of the participation variable). Other differences reside in 
the measurement of capital and the construction of the participation measure. 
Zwick’s second-step regression results for a specification in which works councils 
are assumed exogenous indicates that the innovative work practice(s) is positive and well 
determined, elevating productivity by 25 percent. However, accounting for the 
nonrandom distribution of works councils in an endogenous switching regression model 
shows that the pro-productive effect of participatory work practices (or one such practice) 
only obtains in works council firms. Although the story is similar to that told by Wolf and 
Zwick – in the sense that innovatory practices are conceived to rectify structural 
productivity deficits – the main result is very different: innovations only bear fruit in 
works council regimes. This result is analogous to that of Cooke (1994) for the United 
States (see Table 1, row 4). No other German study reaches so stark a conclusion. 
Unfortunately, the coefficient estimate for the participation variable in works council 
plants is only marginally significant so that it is not clear that it differs from the 
statistically insignificant coefficient estimate for participation in the sample of plants 
without works councils.  
 One of the routes through which works councils and all voice institutions are 
supposed to influence productivity is by encouraging investments by the firm in training.   
Although the German literature has dwelt at some length on the labor turnover issue, 
there has been little direct analysis of further training. A rare exception is final study in 
row 6 of Table 4, in which Zwick (2002) examines the determinants of such training and 
its impact on labor productivity. As in the two preceding studies, the basic framework is 
again a mix of cross section and two-stage panel estimation with endogenous training. In   33
addition to detailed establishment controls, the equations include three other innovative 
work practices. These are identical to those previously grouped under ‘participation’ in 
the row 5 study, namely, a shifting of responsibilities to lower levels in the hierarchy 
(termed ‘employee participation’), the presence of teamwork and self-directed groups, 
and work groups/units with their own costs and results accounting. These three practices 
are now treated as exogenous, as is works council presence. 
  Zwick finds that training intensity (share of trained employees in the workforce) 
as well as several types of training (especially formal external training) have positive 
effects on productivity in cross section and in the second-step panel estimation procedure. 
In both cases, accounting for the endogeneity of training either by predicting training 
intensity or by including an inverse Mills ratio term (the probability of a training 
presence) in the regression tends to increases the magnitude of well determined 
coefficient estimates, suggesting that there is a greater  tendency to train when 
productivity is low. The effect of the panel estimation is also to increase the measured 
impact of training. But of the other innovative work practices none is statistically 
significant in cross section and just one (shifting of responsibilities to lower levels in the 
hierarchy) is significant in most of the second-step panel estimates. A positive association 
between works council presence and productivity is discerned in cross section but in the 
second-step panel estimates the coefficient estimates for this variable are statistically 
insignificant throughout. Unlike the work practices, however, work councils are included 
as a determinant of training (i.e. training intensity) and their influence is positive and 
statistically significant, a result that is ascribed to the absence or attenuation of hold up – 
this time on the part of employers – in works council regimes.  
The increasing sophistication of the German studies in the attempt to control for 
selection into either innovative working practices, including training, or works council 
status while taking account of unobserved plant heterogeneity has to be measured against 
the limitations of the data. As far as selection into works council status is concerned, we 
do know that works council presence is not random but is related to establishment size 
and the structure of the work force, among other things. However, the introduction or 
presence of a works council is not the result of a rational choice made by the owners or 
managers of an establishment based on comparing costs and benefits; rather, it is the   34
results of actions taken by the employees. Employee action might well be related to the 
past performance of the establishment, but whether an establishment has a works council 
at a point in time should not be viewed as caused by contemporaneous productivity. This 
might suggest that one can treat works council status as exogenous to the establishment, 
not least given the difficulties of identifying the works council equation in a convincing 
manner. Identification issues also loom large when it comes to the identifying equations 
for innovative work practices, including training. Understandably, analysts have switched 
between treating works councils and innovative work practices as endogenous according 
to the emphasis of the particular study, but this approach has produced some 
inconsistencies.  
More might be expected from panel estimates that control for unobserved plant 
heterogeneity. Unfortunately, there is the problem that that works council status tends not 
to change over time – for example, in balanced panels from the IAB Establishment Panel, 
1997-2000, around two percent of plants change their works council status. And as 
regards the innovative works practices, we lack longitudinal data altogether. Given the 
lack of temporal variation in works councils status and HPWPs for either reason, the 
Black-Lynch procedure has found favor. The problem is course that the estimated 
coefficients for works councils and innovative practices in the second step may be biased 
by reason of correlation between these variables and unobserved time-invariant 
establishment characteristics. For example, as noted earlier, better managers are more 
likely to be observed in plants with HPWPs so that what appears to be a productivity 
effect of innovative practices is good management. A further problem is that if we lack 
longitudinal information on HRWPs, we cannot assume that their frequency did not 
change materially over the sample period in question.  
Despite these and other concerns (not least the lack of information on the numbers 
of workers covered by HPWPs and on ‘type’ of works council), the German literature 
suggests that works councils and innovative practices may have favorable effects on 
productivity. Indeed, we have reviewed material that attributes major productivity gains 
to each. But average wage council effects are unlikely to be strong. We mainly base this 
conclusion on estimates obtained for samples of plants employing between 21 and 100 
workers where there is a ‘balanced’ representation of works council and non-works   35
council establishments and where the powers of works councils are a datum. As far as 
HPWPs are concerned, it would be idle to claim that there is agreement as to which 
measures work. The disputation over profit sharing is the main case in point. Not 
surprisingly, therefore, when we come to consider the interaction between works councils 
and innovative work practices the situation is not transparent. But we think the evidence 
supports the notion that innovative work practices allow works council firms to achieve 
improved productivity if not necessarily higher productivity than non-works council 
firms.   
One further caveat is the near exclusive focus in recent German work on the 
productivity outcome. We have no information on possible increases in labor costs 
occasioned by operating HPWPs, as suggested by some U.S. research. We do know that 
wages are higher in works council regimes (see Table 2, row 1), but we can infer little 
from this because there is no indication that works council presence has any effect on the 
excess of wages over those laid down under collective agreements. It remains a 
possibility that works councils may cause wage or incentive pay drift, or that they inflate 
nonwage costs, but there is as yet no real evidence to substantiate this. 
Two final issues are whether works councils and HPWRs are substitutes or 
complements, and the status of the often-encountered argument that German employers 
would have to invent works councils were they not legislated. There is evidence to favor 
both substitutability and complementarity. Examples of the former include the finding of 
a negative association between teamworking and works council presence and the greater 
frequency of HPWPs in the absence of works councils (or, in their presence, where works 
councils are antagonistic). Examples of the latter are the positive association between 
works councils and group incentives and training.  
The idea that works councils would have to be invented were they not legislated is 
certainly not a finding that leaps from the pages of the early works council literature or 
even from the more recent literature without qualification. One such qualification may be 
plant size. Unfortunately, it is difficult to test the argument that works councils are 
beneficial in large establishments (such as those of the former Krupp organization). This 
is because nearly all such plants are covered by works councils, and conversely for small 
plants. Another qualification is that establishments may need to be covered by a   36
collective agreement to blunt the bargaining or hold-up implications of codetermination. 
A final set of qualifications would presumably involve the contribution of innovative 
working practices and cooperative relations. Overall, then, the statement attributed to 
Herr Beitz is not particularly informative.   
 
V. Conclusions  
We have examined the effects of worker representation in unions and works councils, and 
of employee involvement/innovative work practices – and their interaction – on firm 
performance. In view of the doubts concerning the performance effects of high 
performance work practices and controversies surrounding the effects of worker 
representation – both of which aspects are addressed in our analysis – the results of the 
exercise might have been predicted to be both compartmentalized and pessimistic. But 
we have largely interpreted the worker representation literature as indicating that the   
effect of unions on productivity are likely to be small on average so that we should look 
to factors such as innovative work practices in explaining the diversity in the effects of 
worker representation in different settings. Expressed in terms of the theoretical 
conjectures on unions, the interaction of worker representation and HPWPs provides a 
practical means of peering inside the union black box. We would incline to the same 
interpretation of the works council institution, even if unobserved works council type 
may turn out to be a more important source of variation in overall performance. 
We reported evidence of positive HPWP effects in both countries and also of 
positive interactions with worker representation. The suggestion is, then, that 
combinations of innovative practices and worker representation can yield substantial 
productivity gains. In Germany, HPWPs may be an important means of restoring 
competitiveness and works councils may assist in their introduction. Yet there should be 
no pretense to precision in all of this in the sense of the literature having uncovered a well 
determined hierarchy for productivity performance, or blue-print for the future of unions 
in particular. This is not unexpected and reflects the limitations of both literatures – 
namely, the notion of collective voice and the high performance paradigm – underscored 
throughout by pronounced measurement difficulties. Here the cautionary remarks of   37
Wood and de Menezes (1998) based on the British experience are also apropos for the 





1. The composite employee involvement/innovative work practices has no settled 
meaning. I will use it to include profit-sharing/share ownership arrangements, 
consultative bodies, team working, quality circles and problem-solving groups, briefing 
groups, systematic use of the management chain to communicate, and regular meetings 
with senior management plus benchmarking, total quality management (TQM), training, 
job security, job rotation, and payment for skill acquisition, inter al. 
 
2. There is inevitably some artificiality in this separation. For example, some models in 
the spirit of collective voice stress that successful employee involvement required the 
presence of a union before workers will practice consummate as opposed to perfunctory 
cooperation (Levine and Tyson, 1990). 
 
3. For a slew of tests of the hypothesis for Britain, see Machin and Wood (2005). 
 
4. For the public goods argument to have force, two further conditions must be met – 
both of which are contained in Freeman (1976, p. 362). First, costs must be incurred in 
using external markets: if quitting were costless, the individual worker could simply 
choose the employer whose working conditions most closely approximated his/her own 
preferences. Second, the workplace must continue to be buffeted by unforeseen shocks 
that change the nature of the workplace in an informational context; otherwise, there 
would be no need for the union’s demand-revealing function after the formative match 
between employer and worker.  
 
5. The notion that unions might help increase training has formally been allied to contract 
enforcement by Dustmann and Schönberg (2004), who argue that the 
unavailability/infeasibilty of long-term wage agreements means that training will be 
underprovided in regular markets and that unions move (apprenticeship) training closer to 
the social optimum by guaranteeing trained workers at least the union wage in the future. 
Since wage compression is also involved, unions facilitate firm-financed general training 
in this model (see also Acemoglu and Pischke, 1999). 
  
6. The equation assumes constant returns to scale, which constraint is relaxed by adding a 
measure of establishment size, lnL, to the regressors. 
 
7. For an attempt to detect some systematic patterns in production function studies 
covering the cement industry, building construction, government bureaus, schools, 
hospitals, and textiles, see Addison and Hirsch (1989).   38
 
8. While confirming Hirsch’s (1991) R&D results for the United States, Menezes-Filho, 
Ulph, and van Reenen (1998) cannot replicate them for Britain. Indeed, Menezes-Filho 
and van Reenen (2003) report that the results are not robust for continental Europe either. 
So, although the association between unionism and R&D is negative in this bloc as well, 
it is again seemingly driven by unions being concentrated in older, low-tech industries. 
 
9. For example, Hirsch (1991) finds that the negative effect of union coverage on 
productivity growth in his sample of 572 publicly quoted companies falls precipitously 
and approach zero with the addition of successively more detailed industry controls.   
Having corrected for positively correlated firm residuals across time, the coefficient 
estimates for union coverage in specifications with detailed industry controls become 
statistically insignificant.   
 
10. But for evidence of higher closure rates among union establishments in Britain, see 
Addison, Heywood, and Wei (2003); Bryson (2004). The German evidence is noted 
below. 
 
11. Huselid (1995) reported that his additive indices of HPWPs were associated with 
reduced labor turnover, higher sales per employee, and improvements in (one measure of) 
financial performance among his cross-section sample of 986 firms.  
 
12. For example, their capital stock measure is constructed from information on the book 
value of assets in the base year (1987) and new investments in each year, net of an 
estimate of the fraction of capital that is used up each year. In additional to longitudinal 
measures of the firm’s capital stock – and capital vintage – the dataset contains 
information on the average education of the workforce, recruitment strategies, the 
number of employees trained, and  computer usage, etc. 
 
13. In addition to the within estimator, the authors use a GMM estimator in the first step 
to deal with biases stemming from the endogeneity of capital, labor, and materials. 
   
14. The authors note that, although individually only one interaction term was statistically 
significant, they rejected at the .05 level the joint null that all four interactions were zero.  
 
15. The authors provide a parallel analysis of earnings and earnings change, not 
summarized in the table. The results are mixed, meaning that not all innovations 
influence productivity and earnings in the same way. 
 
16. For a matching model of TQM introduction, see Easton and Jarrell (1998). 
 
17. For industry-level studies of union impact see, for example, Schnabel (1989); 
Schnabel and Wagner (1992). 
 
18. Among the best examples are the papers by FitzRoy and Kraft (1985, 1987, and 
1990) that deploy systems of equations in examining profitability, total factor   39
productivity, and innovation, respectively, in a small sample of a little over 60 metal 
working firms. The unifying theme of all three papers is a managerial 
pressure/managerial competence model: efficient managers are able to elicit greater effort 
from their workforces without interference from works councils and are also able to 
institute adequate systems of communication and decision-making and avoid (the delays 
associated with) works councils, partly by paying higher wages. As can be seen in Table 
4, below, this model is qualified in a more recent study by the authors (FitzRoy and 
Kraft, 1995). 
  
19. For further information on all three data sets, see respectively Brand, Carstensen, 
Gerlach, and Klodt (1996), Widmaier (2001), and Kolling 2000). 
 
20. But for an interesting study of quits, hires, and labor fluctuation using the NIFA-
Panel that exploits works council type, see Dilger (2002).   
 
21. Most German studies report that the simple association between works councils and 
wages is positive and statistically significant. But investigation of the excess of wages 
over those agreed to in collective agreements does not point in the same direction (see 
Addison, Schnabel, and Wagner, 2001, in row 1 of Table 1); see also FitzRoy and Kraft 
(1985). 
 
22. No less important, the materials costs – measured as the percentage share of sales 
represented by materials costs – often seem to be little more than informed guesses. 
 
23. Quantile regression analysis suggests that the large pro-productive effects for the all-
establishment sample in the Hannover Firm Panel are driven by highly productive plants; 
that is, they are detected only in plants at the top end of the conditional productivity 
distribution (see Addison, Schank, Schnabel, and Wagner, 2004). Our preliminary 
analysis of the IAB Establishment Panel points to similar   results – at least for the key 
manufacturing sector. The suggestion may be that only highly competent managers can 
cooperate with a works council in a way that materially advances productivity. 
 
24. The exception is that the latter do find a positive effect of profit sharing on labor 
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Table 1: Selected U.S. Studies Examining the Effect of Employee Involvement/High Performance Work Practices on Performance 
 





1991 sample of 
820 publicly-
quoted companies 
with more than 100 
employees; and a 
panel of 218 
companies, 1991-
93, also used in 
cross section for 
1991 and 1993. 
Cross section, fixed 
effects, and random effects 
models.  Dependent 
variable: financial 
performance, measured by 
Tobin’s q and the gross 
rate of return on assets. 
13 high performance work 
practices. Factor analysis 
used to identify 2 factors or 
groupings, and scales 
constructed for each factor 
by averaging those 
questions loading clearly 
on each respective factor. 
However, since the effects 
of a change in the human 
resource system was found 
to be the same whether it 
occurred through a unit 
change in either factor, the 
authors subsequently sum 
the two dimensions. 
Union coverage included 
in the control set, but its 
effect not separately 
identified. 
Strong effects of human resource 
strategy (factors and summed 
factors) on financial performance 
reported in cross section. 
Specifically, a one standard 
deviation increase in the firm’s 
usage of high performance work 
systems increased Tobin’s q by 
14% and the accounting rate of 
return by between 13 and 28%.  
In the fixed effects specifications, 
however, the effects were only 
one-fourth as large and were 
statistically insignificant 
throughout. However, correction 
for measurement error in the 
panel is claimed to yield impact 
effects that are in line with the 







36 production lines 
of 17 steel  
producers. Up to 
2,190 monthly 
observations in the 
panel. 




uptime, namely, the 
fraction of scheduled 
operating time that the line 
actually runs.  
Up to 15 individual human 
resource management 
variables are identified. 
Grouped into 4 HRM 
‘systems’ from HRM1 
(‘traditional’) where none 
of (11) practices were 
encountered to HRM4 
(‘innovative’) where all 
practices are found.  
Identification of grouping 
is on the basis of 
inspection, but also 
supported by/robust to 
Meetings with unions and 
union status of the 
production line. 
OLS results show that uptime 
increases monotonically in 
degree of HRM innovation. Fixed 
effect estimates – based on HRM 
group changers – also indicates 
this positive hierachical pattern.  
Estimated productivity effects 
very similar across specifications. 
No real indication that individual 
HRM practices or unionism have 
an additional (to HRM group) 
effect on the production measure 
in either OLS or fixed effect 
specifications. In short.    47
Study Data  Methodology EI/HWPA  measure  Union  variable  Findings 
statistical classification 
procedures. Models 
include up to 25 controls 
for detailed features of the 
line (e.g. line width and 
speed). 







Surveys of 1994 
and 1997 matched 
to the 1977 
Longitudinal 
Research Database 
(LRD) to provide 
panels for 1977-93 
and 1977-96.  
Number of 
observations is 443 
and 666 





some time after 
1977 so that their 
‘levels’ observed 
in 1993 and 1996 
can be used in first 
difference 
estimates.  
OLS regressions for 1993 
and 1996 cross sections 
and for models in first 
differences.  Dependent 
variables: log sales per 
worker; log labor costs per 
worker; log of the inverse 
of unit labor costs. 
11 work practices 
including benchmarking 
and computer usage in 
addition to ‘employee 
involvement mechanisms’ 
(team working and TQM) 
and supportive measures 
(job rotation, gain-sharing, 
etc.) These considered 
singly and severally in 6 
bundles suggested by a 
priori reasoning. 
No union argument is 
included in the control 
variables. 
The results for productivity 
indicate a positive association 
between individual practices and 
log sales per worker. But 
statistical significance is weak 
and the effect is further 
attenuated in first difference 
estimates. Some evidence of 
potential synergies in the bundles 
but the balance of the main and 
interactive effects is seldom 
statistically significant. The 
results for labor costs suggest that 
several practices increase costs in 
roughly similar amounts to the 
productivity effects. No 
indications of any efficiency 






firms in Michigan, 
1989. 
OLS cross section 
estimates. Dependent 
variable: company 
performance, defined as 
value added net of labor 
cost per employee. Three 
Employee participation, as 
proxied by presence of 
work teams, and group-
based incentives, as 
measured by existence of 
profit/gain sharing plans.  
Union status of the firm is 
interacted with team and 
profit/gain sharing 
variables. Reference 
category: nonunion firms 
with neither team working 
Union firms are 13% more 
efficient than nonunion firms. If 
union firms have teams they are 
35% more efficient than the 
nonunion no-team counterfactual. 
The corresponding advantage of   48
Study Data  Methodology EI/HWPA  measure  Union  variable  Findings 
separate regressions for 
value-added per employee, 
average hourly wages, and 
labor costs as a share of 
labor cost.  Firm 
performance is thus the 
estimated value added per 
employee for the relevant 
EI/HPWP combination less 
the estimated wage 
difference adjusted for the 
labor cost share 
differential. 
nor profit/gain sharing.  nonunion firms with team 
working is actually negative. But 
the addition of profit/gain sharing 
has a much bigger relative payoff 
in nonunion than union firms 
(18% versus 6.5%). The 
interaction of teams and 
profit/gain sharing is modest in 
nonunion firms and negative in 
union firms. No significance 
levels of these effects are 
provided.  









for 1994 matched 
to information 




variable: log sales per 
employee. Cross -section 
estimates for 1994 plus 
panel analysis for 1987-93 
period. The panel analysis 
uses within and GMM 
estimators to first derive 
average residuals for each 
establishment. These 
residuals are then regressed 
on the EI/HPWP measures 
and other time-invariant 




6 variables proxying 
HPWP (TQM, 
benchmarking, number of 
managerial levels, number 
of employees per 
supervisor, proportion of 
workers in self-managed 
teams, and log number of 
workers in training); 2 
measures of ‘employee 
voice’ (unionization, and 
proportion of worker 
meeting regularly in 
groups); and 2 types of 
profit sharing (for 
management and for 
production workers).  
Union presence plus 
interactions with 
nonmanagerial profit 
sharing and TQM. 
In the cross sections only one 
HPWP – benchmarking – is 
statistically significant. No 
synergies between the HPWPs 
are detected. Of the other 
variables, the proportion of 
workers meeting in groups and 
profit sharing schemes for 
production workers often seem to 
raise productivity. Of the 
interactions tested, there is a 
positive association between 
unionism and profit sharing for 
production workers. The panel 
estimators produce basically 
similar results except that TQM 
now enters negatively as does the 
union variable. The latter effect is 
offset by the union-profit sharing 
interaction.  




for 1994 and 1997. 
Cross-section 
Cobb-Douglas production 
function estimates in cross 
section (1996) and first 
Somewhat different mix to 
Black and Lynch (2001) in 
row 5. In addition to the 
Union presence plus 
interactions of the union 
measure with profit 
For the 1996 cross section, of the 
HPWP measures only the 
positive effect of profit sharing   49
Study Data  Methodology EI/HWPA  measure  Union  variable  Findings 





Dependent variable: log 
sales per worker. Parallel 
wage functions are also 
estimated for 1996 and 
1993-96. 
proportion of workers in 
self- managed teams, 
benchmarking, and the 
number of managerial 
levels, the HPWP set also 
includes ‘re-engineering’ 
and profit sharing.  
Employee voice variables 
are as before, namely, 
union presence and the 
proportion of workers 
meeting regularly in 
groups. 
sharing, re-engineering, 
and the percentage of 
workers meeting regularly 
in groups. 
on productivity is well 
determined across specifications. 
The union role, but not the other 
voice argument is positive and 
statistically significant. But the 
union profit sharing interaction 
term is larger and of opposite 
sign. The union re-engineering 
interaction term is positive and 
well determined. For the panel 
estimates, the effect of re-
engineering (proportions of 
workers in self-managed teams) 
is positive (negative) and well 
determined.  Neither voice 
argument is statistically 
significant. No interaction team is 
statistically significant other than 
that between union presence and 
the proportion of workers 
meeting regularly in groups, 
which is strongly positive.  For 
their part, the wage regressions 
show further variation.  
 
Notes: 
a   See also Huselid (1995). 
 b   See also Ichniowski (1990). 
 c      See also Cooke (1992).
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Table 2:  Recent Estimates of the Effects of Works Councils on Performance. 
 
Study Data Dependent  Variable  Methodology  Works council 








from the 1994 
wave. 
Value added per worker; 
subjective measures of 
financial performance; 
wages and salaries per 
employee (and the 
percentage ‘wage gap’); 
three labor turnover 
measures (hires, separations 
and gross turnover); and two 
innovation measures 
(introduction of new 
processes/products). 
Single equation estimates. 
Separate results for all -
establishment sample and 
subset of plants with 21-100 
employees. 
Works council presence. Controls 
include establishment size/age; 
measures of workforce composition 
and skill; product market 
competition; capacity utilization; 
profit sharing; state of technology; 
‘excessive’ wage costs; and 
industry dummies. 
Works council presence is 
associated with higher productivity 
overall but not for plants with 21-
100 employees. Profitability 
systematically lower in works 
council regimes. Wages higher in 
the presence of works councils, but 
sources of these higher earnings are 
not transparent. All labor turnover 
measures are reduced in works 
council settings, other than for the 
subset of smaller establishments. 
Innovation measure unaffected by 
works control presence. 




data from the 
1994 and 1996 
waves. 
Value-added per employee 
and wages and salaries per 
employee. 
Bivariate probit maximum 
likelihood estimates of works 
council presence and 
coverage by collective 
agreement to form selection 
arguments in wage and 
productivity equations.  
Works council presence and 
coverage by a collective agreement. 
Controls include establishment 
age/size/legal status; product 
market competition; measures of 
workforce composition and skill; 
profit sharing; state of technology; 
team work; and industry dummies. 
In separate productivity regressions 
by collective bargaining status, the 
positive effect of works councils on 
performance is statistically 
significant only where the plant is 
covered by a collective agreement. 
Wages are higher under both 
collective bargaining regimes, 
although the effect is better 
determined where there is no 
collective agreement.   51
Study Data Dependent  Variable  Methodology  Works council 
measure/controls  Findings 






1998 and 2000. 
Log value added.  OLS estimation of Cobb-
Douglas, CES, and translog 
production functions. 
Separate estimates for West 
and East Germany; summary 
results for manufacturing and 
services. 
Works council presence. In addition 
to  log capital (proxied by 
replacement investment)and  log 
employment, the regressors 
comprise:  profit sharing for 
employees; process innovation; 
product innovation; employment of 
apprentices; coverage by a 
collective agreement; percentage of  
qualified employees; percentage of 
sales exported; and 14 sector 
dummies. 
Plants with works councils have 
sharply higher productivity of 25% 
(30%) in West (East) Germany.  
Disaggregation by sector confirms 
results other than for West German 
manufacturing in both 1998 and 
2000.  Works council interaction 












of plants with 
21-100 
employees. 
Log sales  Fixed effects stochastic 
frontier production function 
estimated separately for 
plants with and without works 
councils and for balanced and 
unbalanced panels. The 
comparison is between the 
technical efficiency estimates 
– and the 95% confidence 
intervals – of the median 
works council plant and its 
non-works council 
counterpart.  
Works council presence. Regressors 
include log employment; shares of 
part-time, skilled, and female 
employees; 41 sector dummies; and 
7 year dummies. 
There are no statistically significant 
differences in efficiency between 
establishments with and without 
works councils. Results robust to 
disaggregation by broad sector and 
to time interval (use of two 














Changes in quits, sales per 
employee, employment, and 
the profit-situation. 
Nonparametric propensity 
score matching model. 
‘Treated’ group comprises all 
plants in which a works 
council was set up between 
1996 and 1998. Matched 
plants derived from 1,513 
controls. 
Introduction of a works council.  Mean values for the performance 
indicators in establishments that 
experienced the formation of a 
works council are not statistically 
different from those obtaining in 
plants that remained free of works 
councils. Results are robust to 
outliers. 
6. Addison,  IAB  Plant closings.  Probit estimates for the  Works council presence. Apart  For the aggregate sample, works   52
Study Data Dependent  Variable  Methodology  Works council 






following samples: all-plants; 
plants stratified by whether or 
not they are covered by a 
collective agreement; plants 
stratified by size (less than or 
more that 50 employees); and 
plants stratified by both 
collective agreement and size. 
from coverage by a collective 
agreement and establishment size, 
the covariates include plant age; 
workforce composition and skills; 
recent layoff experience; state of 
technology; regional unemployment 
rate; and industry dummies. 
councils associated with 
significantly higher closings. Works 
council effect is sharper for the 
uncovered sector and for smaller 
plants but the difference is not 
statistically significant. Only for 
small plants that are covered by a 
collective agreement is there any 
suggestion that collective 
bargaining coverage can lower 
closure rate.  
   53
Table 3:  Works Council Coefficient Estimates from a Translog Production Function 
Fitted to IAB Establishment Panel Data, 1997-2000 
_______________________________________________________________________ 
                S e c t o r  
Sample   All   Manufacturing    Services 
_______________________________________________________________________ 
 
Firms with 21-100 
employees 
 
Pooled 0.118***  0.046  0.183*** 
 (3.22)  (1.03)  (3.05) 
 
1997 0.123*  0.119*  0.098 
 (1.86)  (1.73)  (0.82) 
1998 0.107*  0.063  0.145 
 (1.94)  (0.94)  (0.61) 
1999 0.056  -0.011  0.139* 
 (1.16)  (0.18)  (1.72) 
2000 0.172***  0.070  0.269*** 
 (3.60)  (1.22)  (3.41) 
 
Firms with ≥5 
employees 
 
Pooled 0.232**  0.177***  0.275*** 
 (8.88)  (5.71)  (3.05) 
________________________________________________________________________ 
|t| - values in parentheses 
 
Notes:  The dependent variable is log total sales. In addition to the log capital stock, log 
number of employees, and works council presence, the regressors are: investment in ICT, 
state of technology, workforce composition (share of part timers, apprentices, and skilled 
workers), coverage by a collective agreement, a dummy for eastern Germany and, for the 
relevant pooled/cross section regressions, sector and/or year dummies. 
***, * denote significance at the .01 and .10 levels, respectively.   
Source: Addison, Schank, Schnabel, and Wagner (2003). 
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Table 4:  Selected German Studies Examining the Effect of Innovative Work Practices and Works Councils on Performance  
Study Data  Methodology  EI/HPWP  measure  Works council 





from the sixth 




types of HPWP, 
as well as five 
types of works 




Descriptive analysis of 
HPWPs by works council 
presence, involvement, and 
type. Multiple classification 
analysis for same categories 
as in descriptive treatment 
and five covariates (number 
of employees, sales per-
employee, stock of orders, 
and capacity/manpower 
utilization). 
The five measures are: 
reduction in hierarchies; 
delegation of decision 
making; work groups 
with independent 
budgets; group or team 
work; flexible working 
time.  
Five works council 
types range from 
‘antagonistic’ to 
‘excluded.’ The  









change than laid 
down under law or 
by collective 
agreements. 
Plants with works councils use more 
HPWPs than do plants without works 
councils, but difference is not statistically 
significant. Plants with more involved 
works councils have more HPWPs than 
their less involved counterparts. But the 
number of HPWPs is highest in 
circumstances where works council is 
rated ‘antagonistic.’ HPWPs are reported 
to have a positive effect on establishment 






Pooled data for 
1977 and 1979 




Value added production 
function estimated 
separately for profit-sharing 
firms and non profit-sharing 
firms, with correction for 
selection into profit sharing 
status. Also estimation of 
full interaction equation for 
the whole sample. 
Profit sharing for the 
workforce. 
Presence of works 
council. 
The effect of works councils on 
productivity measure is negative and 
statistically significant in non-sharing 
firms but is positive and statistically 
significant in profit-sharing firms. 
Interaction effect between works councils 
and profit-sharing in full interaction 




from the 1994 
and 1996 waves 
of the Hannover 
Firm Panel. 
Single-equation OLS pooled 
productivity estimates. 
Dependent variable: value 
added per employee. 
Auxiliary probit model of 
works council presence 
provided but not used to 
instrument works council 
presence. Separate estimates 
for all plants and subset of 
plants with 21-100 
employees. 
Managerial profit 
sharing. Some innovative 
practices are also 
included in the probit 
equation (e.g. further 
training and flexible 
working hours) but not in 
the productivity equation. 
Works council 
presence. 
Executive profit sharing schemes are 
productive for both samples. The 
interaction between executive profit 
sharing schemes and works council 
presence is negative and statistically 
significant for the all-establishment 
sample. Works council effect is positive 
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Study Data  Methodology  EI/HPWP  measure  Works council 
variable  Findings 




Panel, for a 
1999 cross 
section and a 
1996-99 panel. 
Cobb-Douglas production 
function with capital 
approximated by 
replacement investments. 
Dependent variable: value 
added and average value 
added. Cross-section 
estimates with and without 
correction for endogeniety 
of HPWP. For the panel, the 
estimation follows the 
Black-Lynch (2001) two-
step procedure (see Table 1, 
row entry 5), with the 
second stage also 
controlling for the 
endogeneity of HPWPs.  
Six HPWPs: shifting of 
responsibilities to lower 
level in hierarchy; team 




sharing; training to 
support organizational 
change; and incentive 
training. These HPWPs 
are aggregated into two 
independent factors 
(‘organizational change’ 





In cross section, the positive effect of 
‘incentives’ (share ownership, profit 
sharing, supportive training, and incentive 
training) results from their being 
introduced by firms when they are 
prospering. In the panel (second- step) 
estimates and after correcting for selection, 
‘organizational changes’ (shifting 
responsibilities, team work, and 
independent work groups) have 
significantly positive effect on productivity 
and are also introduced to deal with 
structural problems – structural 
productivity gaps. No interaction between 
‘incentives’ and ‘organizational changes.’ 
Separate works council effect not robust in 
cross section, but in panel estimates work 
council presence has significantly positive 











added and average value-
added. In other words, the 
same two-step procedure 
used by Wolf and Zwick 
(2002) but with GMM 
(GMM-SYS) estimator 
rather than within estimator 
alone to estimate the 
production function and the 
time-invariant establishment 
fixed effect.  
‘Participative work forms’ 
based on delegation of 
responsibility and decision 
making to lower-levels in 
the hierarchy, team work, 
and work groups with 
independent budgets. 
These three measures are 
aggregated to form a 
single participation 
variable set equal to one if 
at least one of the three 
measures had been 








council presence in 
a switching 
regression model.  
After accounting for the endogeneity of 
participative work forms, the productivity 
effect of such practices is around 25 
percent. In the switching regression, (the 
instrumented value for) participation is 
only (marginally) statistically significant in 
the sample of works council firms. 
Selection into works council status is well 
determined in both equations.     56
Study Data  Methodology  EI/HPWP  measure  Works council 







1998 and 1999 




Dependent variable: value 
added. Cross section 
estimates of effect of 
continuous training in 1997 
on labor productivity levels 
in 1998 and 1999. Selection 
into training status handled 
through a probit regression 
used to calculate the 
probability that a firm offers 
training  and  a Tobit 
equation to predict the 
intensity of training.
b Fixed 
effects panel estimation 
using two-step procedure as 
in row 4 and 5 studies, also 
with and without selectivity 
correction. 
Training incidence (i.e. 
presence); training 
intensity (number of 
trainees divided by 
number of employees); 
and training type (formal 
external courses, formal 
internal courses, training 
on the job, seminars and 
talks, job rotation, self-




In cross section, (lagged) effects of 
training intensity – actual and predicted – 
are positively associated with labor 
productivity. Formal external training 
courses also positive and statistically 
significant throughout. Negative effect of 
training on-the-job. Selection term is 
negative. Panel estimates indicate that 
training intensity, formal external and 
internal courses, and self-induced learning 
have a positive and significant effect on 
productivity; after selection is accounted 
for, the coefficient estimates for training 
intensity and formal training courses 
increase in size. Coefficient estimate for 
the works council dummy is positive and 
statistically significant in cross-section 




a   See also Addison and Teixeira (2004). 
            
b  See also Gerlach and Jirjahn (2001). 
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